1 Furthermore, the proportions of the labor force represented by unions and by licensing (their "densities") at their peaks have been roughly equal at 30 percent.
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licensing cause converse effects? That is, would de-licensing increase the number of practitioners while decreasing earnings? If so, how sizable are these effects and how rapidly would they occur? These questions are particularly important because the extent to which job regulation (such as licensing) inhibits job growth and the potential for deregulation to promote job growth have recently become important national issues.
De-licensed occupations at the state level
As we discuss in the following subsections, our research of state legislative audit committee records, CLEAR reports, and various other sources has revealed only eight instances of the de-licensing of occupations over the past 40 years.
Barbers in Alabama
The National Association of Barber Schools (NABS) (which no longer exists) formerly published annual reports listing the various barber licensing requirements for all states. 7 According to its reports, in the early 1970s,
Alabama was the only state without a barber licensing law, although the NABS data also indicated that "some Alabama counties had barber laws." Effective in 1973, the Alabama legislature passed a licensing law that In 2000, a bill was introduced in the Alabama senate to again license barbers, but the bill did not pass. However, in 2012, another barber licensing bill was introduced, and in May 2013, it became law. As its sponsor stated, "In a business where personal services are being administered, there is a duty to make those services safe and sanitary with the highest level of care."
9
The new Alabama law requires that all barbers be licensed, with fines of $500 and up to 30 days in prison for those who practice without a license. To become a licensed barber, one must complete at least 1,000 clock hours of instruction in a school of barbering and pass an examination. (A person already working as a barber on the effective date of the act is grandfathered, however.) Finally, the act replaces the Alabama Board of Cosmetology with the Alabama Board of Cosmetology and Barbering, which now regulates barbers as well as cosmetologists, aestheticians, manicurists, and natural hairstylists.
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The licensing regime for barbers in Alabama has been unique in its transformation from a situation of no licensing to one of licensing, with the cycle repeated. Interestingly, to be a licensed cosmetologist in Alabama requires 50 percent more hours of schooling than the number of hours to be a licensed barber (1,500 hours vs.
1,000 hours), despite the similar services of each occupation.
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Morticians (funeral directors) in Colorado
Currently, morticians are commonly referred to as "funeral directors," although the term "undertaker" is also still In its role as a "sunrise review" committee, the Office of Policy, Research and Regulatory Reform of the Colorado Department of Regulatory Agencies (DORA) has repeatedly recommended against reimposing licensing, arguing that "there is no evidence that a licensing board could improve existing oversight."
13
Naturopaths in Virginia
According to the American Association of Naturopathic Physicians, naturopathic medicine encompasses exercise, changes in lifestyles, and certain natural therapies. Naturopathic doctors or "naturopaths" combine traditional natural healing methods with modern medical science. Colleges of naturopathic medicine appeared in the United States as early as 1902; however, in the middle of the 20th century, interest in naturopathic medicine declined with the widespread use of antibiotics and scientific medicine. However, in the 1970s, interest was renewed with the growing popularity of alternative medicine.
14 Currently, 16 states have licensing laws for naturopaths, and some of these laws date back to the early decades of the 20th century. To receive a license, naturopaths must graduate from an accredited 4-year naturopathic medical school and pass a board examination. 
Interior designers in Alabama
Interior designers make interior spaces functional, safe, and attractive for most types of buildings (e.g., offices, homes, shopping malls, and restaurants). They also select colors, furniture, flooring, wall coverings, lighting, and other materials for the interiors of buildings. 26 Some claim that no clear distinction exists between the occupation "interior designer" and the more familiar occupation "interior decorator," although the American
Society of Interior Designers contends that the former occupation requires more education and experience. 
Watchmakers in Minnesota and Wisconsin
Minnesota began to regulate watchmakers in 1943. 31 In that year, the Minnesota Board of Examiners in
Watchmaking was established. The Minnesota law defined watchmaking as "the repairing, replace [sic], rebuilding, readjusting or regulating of the mechanical parts of watches, and the repairs thereof and the manufacturing and fitting of parts designed for use or used in watches." 32 Minnesota law required all persons engaged in this occupation to have a registration certificate. However, Minnesota later amended the law to require a license with annual renewal. Applicants for a license were required to have served an apprenticeship and to pass an examination. The Board could also revoke licenses of persons for incompetence or unethical conduct.
The Minnesota law was repealed in 1983 when the number of watchmakers in the state had dropped to fewer than 100. 33 Many other states had also attempted to license watchmakers, but eventually, the courts struck down most attempts. 34 Nonetheless, a number of other states have set up certification procedures for watchmakers.
As for Wisconsin, a law was passed in 1937 requiring that watchmakers be licensed. 35 A five-member Board of
Examiners administered the statute, administered examinations, and issued "certificates of registration." In 1979, the Board was abolished, thereby ending the licensing requirement. Wisconsin watchmakers became eligible for a refund of the fees that they had been required to pay for their licenses.
Restricting the scope of licensing
In addition to the examples of complete de-licensing just mentioned, a number of cases have occurred in which the scope of licensing has been either reduced or prevented from expanding. 36 By "scope," we are referring to how broadly the licensing regulations are interpreted concerning occupations whose characteristics share some similarities with those of the licensed occupation. One occupation in particular should be noted-hair braiders.
Hair braiders do exactly what the name implies, and braided hair is especially popular among African American women. However, in many states, hair braiders have been required to hold a cosmetology license, which can require as many as 2,000 hours of training. Cosmetology training, however, has little to do with hair braiding. In fact, most schools of cosmetology do not teach the technique. In a 1998 case that attracted national attention, the California cosmetology board alleged that a hair braider was practicing without a license. The penalty for practicing without a license is 1 year in jail and a fine. 37 However, a U.S. District Court later struck down as unconstitutional the California law requiring that hair braiders obtain a cosmetology license to practice their trade, ruling that it violated the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. 38 Another suit that attracted national attention was filed in Utah in 2011 against the state's cosmetology law. The
Utah law stipulated that anyone working on hair must hold a cosmetology or barber license, which required 2,000 hours of training. 39 The hair braider in this case had learned traditional hair braiding in her native Sierra
Leone. The state board denied her request to practice without a cosmetology license. But in August 2012, a federal judge ruled that Utah's requirement was unconstitutional. In his ruling, the judge stated, "Utah's cosmetology/barbering licensing scheme is so disconnected from the practice of African hair braiding, much less from whatever minimal threats to public health and safety are connected to braiding, that to premise [the plaintiff's] right to earn a living by braiding hair on that scheme is wholly irrational and a violation of her 43 The monks then filed suit, claiming that their right to due process under the 14th Amendment was being violated under the Louisiana funeral director licensing law. In 2011, a U.S. District Court ruled in favor of the monks, but the case was appealed. 44 In October 2012, the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion in favor of the monks, ruling that restricting the right to sell caskets was either unconstitutional or an abuse of state regulatory power. 45 
Attempts to de-license groups of occupations collectively
As previously noted, our research has discovered only eight instances in the past 40 years of the successful delicensing of an occupation at the state level. And in four of these cases, attempts to relicense the occupations followed soon afterward. However, as discussed in the following subsections, several multiple-occupation delicensing proposals have recently occurred at the state legislative level, which have so far been unsuccessful.
These de-licensing proposals have not gone through the sunset review process. Instead, the proposals have been made in the context of legislative concern that excessive government regulation (of which occupational licensing is one example) may have inhibited job growth.
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North Carolina
In 2011, the North Carolina House of Representatives proposed a bill (House bill 587) entitled "An act to promote North Carolina job growth through regulatory reform." It was nicknamed the North Carolina "Jobs Bill,"
and its purpose was to "remove bad regulations, stop new bad regulations from being enacted, prevent regulatory burdens from impacting growth and hiring, and to remove barriers to market entry for entrepreneurs, including the reassessment, reduction, or removal of State licensure programs." 47 Among its other features, the bill would create a special 12-member Legislative Study Commission on Occupational Licensing, with members appointed by the governor, the state legislature, and the public. 48 The commission's duties would be to
• "identify outdated and unnecessary occupational licensing laws that should be repealed
• identify existing occupations that are regulated that do not require licensing
• study alternatives to occupational licensing laws that would work effectively
• study to what extent occupational licensing laws create barriers for individuals, including low-income individuals, from entering into new occupations."
49
The bill referred to no specific occupations. Although portions of the bill were later incorporated into a Senate bill that was passed (Regulatory Reform Act of 2011), 50 the terms related to occupational de-licensing were dropped.
Florida
In 2011, the Florida House approved a bill that would deregulate 14 licensed occupations, including auctioneers, athlete agents, hair braiders, interior designers, and professional fundraising consultants and solicitors. Support for the bill stemmed from the belief that excessive regulation, such as unnecessary licensing, had hindered the growth of jobs in the state. The bill ultimately failed after it was rejected in the Senate. 51 In 2013, the Florida
House and Senate introduced similar bills (Deregulation of Professions and Occupations-House bill 1189 and
Senate bill 720) but both died in committee.
52
New Hampshire
In 2011, state House bill 446 proposed the repeal of the licensing of more than a dozen occupations licensed at the state level, including barbers, cosmetologists, massage therapists, hunting/fishing guides, and court reporters. 53 After much debate and several amendments, the bill was defeated in January 2012. The next year, however, a new bill, House bill 1265, was introduced that would establish criteria for boards and commissions to regulate occupations as authorized by law. 54 The bill would also create a committee to determine the appropriate level of regulation for each occupation. The language of the bill appears to criticize licensing, as sections I and II of House bill 1265 state:
• Section I: "Occupational licensing requirements are usually implemented at the request of the very groups that are regulated, and not by the consumers they ostensibly protect. Licensing requirements create barriers to entry and decrease competition, which increase prices, although there is little evidence that there is an offsetting increase in consumer protection. . . ."
• Section II: "Licensing often requires formal postsecondary education. This requirement closes doors and reduces upward mobility for those who do not pursue higher education. When licensing requirements are
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10 not based on demonstrated skills, they close off opportunities to advance for persons who learn on the job or pick up skills on their own without formal education."
The New Hampshire bill would instead support certification, or "voluntary licensing," which is "better for consumers than licensing" and which "[s]imilar to licensing . . . sends a signal to consumers about who has met the government's requirements."
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In late 2013, a legislative study committee recommended against advancing the bill for consideration. However, the sponsor of the bill indicated that, at some future time, he will again advance the bill for legislative consideration.
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Indiana
In January 2012, House bill 1006 was introduced in the Indiana General Assembly that would eliminate mandatory licensing for barbers and cosmetologists, as well as for dieticians, hearing aid dealers, PIs, and security guards. 57 The sponsor of the bill stated that "regulations are killing small businesses." However, its sponsor withdrew the bill 1 week after it was introduced presumably because of opposition to the bill, namely from cosmetologists (whose training requirements in Indiana are 1,500 hours and at least 10 years of education).
Soon after the bill was proposed, it was denigrated as the "right to work for less" bill, an acknowledgment that licensing raises earnings. The bill was also criticized because, despite its purported aim of reducing government bureaucracy and saving taxpayer dollars, it would allegedly cause the state to lose more than $1 million in revenue from licensing fees. (Many licensing regimes generate surpluses for state coffers, which may be another obstacle for those seeking deregulation.) Finally, the criticism was raised that, without licensing, many beauty schools would move out of state, thereby eliminating teaching jobs and reducing profits for beauty school operators. 58 As the bill's sponsor put it, "Even though I agree with the overall goal of the legislation-that being less government involvement-I understand that this is not the year to do it, and this is not the legislation to do it with. I decided to withdraw the bill because we can do better."
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The Indiana state senate passed a similar bill (Senate bill 520) in February 2013. 60 This bill would create a committee to "eliminate, reduce, and streamline employee regulation" (the so-called "ERASER committee"). It would also automatically eliminate licensing requirements for some 14 occupations (e.g., dieticians, beauty workers, and massage therapists) over a 5-year period unless the legislature voted to retain them. However, the bill failed to receive a hearing in the state house.
Michigan
The Michigan Office of Regulatory Reinvention (ORR) released a report to the public in April 2012
recommending the complete deregulation of 18 occupations (about half of them licensed), among them acupuncturist, auctioneer, interior designer, dietician, nutritionist, and speech pathologist. 61 The ORR based its recommendations on the findings of a special committee made up of lawyers, business owners, policy analysts,
academics, and officials from the Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs (LARA). Noting that
Michigan is among the most heavily regulated states with respect to occupational licensing, the LARA director stated that "occupational regulations, while in many cases necessary to protect consumers and public health, 
Texas
In June 2013, House bill 86 was signed into law and described as "relating to the criteria for review by the Sunset Advisory Commission." 64 Strictly speaking, the act was not designed to de-license groups of occupations but rather to furnish the Texas Sunset Advisory Commission with a broader set of criteria for de-licensing an occupation. Specifically, the act (effective in September 2013) requires that when the commission reviews an agency that licenses an occupation, the commission will consider the following: 
Connecticut
In January 2013, a bill (Senate bill 324) was introduced in the Connecticut Senate entitled "An act requiring the commissioner of consumer protection to undertake a study of occupational licenses." 67 The bill recommended eliminating those licenses that are not necessary to protect the public health or safety. The reason was to relieve individuals and small businesses by eliminating unnecessary regulatory burdens. At the time of this writing, the bill had not been voted on.
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Missouri
In February 2013, the Missouri House introduced a bill (House bill 590) that would allow persons to practice the occupation of interior design, barbering, or cosmetology without having to secure a license. 68 The only restriction was that such a person may not "hold himself or herself out as a registered interior designer" or as a licensed barber or cosmetologist. The bill was not put forward for a vote. Instead, it was referred to the Committee on Downsizing State Government, whose charge is to consider matters on reducing the size of state government and its programs. It has since died in Committee.
In early 2014, a similar bill (House bill 1891) was introduced that would allow persons engaged in a greater number of specified occupations than the number listed in House bill 590 to practice without a license, again as long as the persons do not claim to be licensed. 69 The occupations mentioned in the bill include geologist; the boxing, sparring, wrestling, and karate occupations; massage therapy; interior designer; PI; landscape architect; barber; cosmetologist; embalmer; funeral agent; and athletic agent. As of the time of this writing, House bill 1891
has not been put forward for a vote.
Finally, in February 2014, a bill (House bill 1824) was introduced that would restrict the imposition of licensing requirements on occupations not regulated as of January 1, 2015. 70 The bill proposes the following principles:
• All individuals may engage in the occupation of their choice, "free from unreasonable government regulation."
• All bills introduced in the legislature to regulate an occupation for the first time should only be so regulated if unregulated practice has greatly harmed and endangered the general welfare of the public.
• If the legislature finds that the state has a compelling interest in regulating a previously unregulated occupation, the least restrictive type of regulation should be implemented.
In April 2014, House bill 1824 failed to pass a vote by the Rules Committee. Not surprisingly, the Missouri chapter of the American Massage Therapy Association, as well as by other affected professional groups, strongly opposed both House bill 1824 and House bill 1891.
Minnesota
A Minnesota bill, the "Licensing Relief and Job Creation Act" (House file 2002), was first proposed in 2011.
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The bill would allow an individual who is practicing without a license in a licensed occupation the right to challenge the licensing requirement in court. Specifically, the bill states that "a person has a right to engage in a lawful occupation free from any substantial burden, unless the government demonstrates it has a compelling interest in protecting against present and recognizable harm to the public health or safety." 72 In such a case, the type of occupational regulation that should be selected should be "the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest."
The bill was first read in the Minnesota House in January 2012 and was referred to the state Commerce and Regulatory Reform Committee. However, the committee did not vote on or consider the bill in the months following its referral. (The committee has not met since then.) In addition, the chief authors of the bill were not reelected for the following legislative term, most likely killing the bill. 
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Friedman's perhaps equally well-known observation that the benefits for licensed groups from licensing legislation are high while the costs to the public (consumers) are relatively low and widely dispersed is also conversely true regarding proposals to de-license. 75 In this case, the costs to the licensed groups from such delicensing are high while the benefits for the public are low and widely dispersed.
Another contributing factor is that, in an accounting sense, licensing and licensing boards are generally expected to (and usually do) pay for themselves. Some may even create small yearly surpluses in their operations. Especially in times of fiscal stress on state budgets, legislatures may be understandably reluctant to eliminate a revenue-producing agency.
As noted earlier, over the past several decades, sunset laws have been passed in several states-about 36 since the 1970s. These laws require the periodic review of certain programs and agencies (such as occupational licensing and licensing boards). The periodic reviews are commonly called performance audits or legislative audits, and they result in a recommendation to either continue or discontinue the licensing of the occupation under review. 76 How effective have these laws been? About half the states that had passed sunset laws later repealed or suspended them, while many others have limited the frequency of the audits. Moreover, in theory, a legislature's decision to terminate or continue licensing is based on the sunset review panel's recommendation. But in fact, these reviews rarely recommend de-licensing. Rather, from our study of performance audits across the states, they usually recommend that the licensing of the occupation be continued. In those rare instances when a performance audit does recommend de-licensing, we have found that the legislature usually ignores the recommendation and votes to continue to license the occupation. Hawaii is an example.
On at least three occasions since the 1980s, the Hawaii Legislative Auditor Office has recommended the complete deregulation of the barbering and beauty worker occupations. However, the Hawaii legislature voted each time to continue licensing the two occupations. Other occupations in Hawaii that have been recommended for de-licensing include mechanics, bail bond agents, dispensing opticians, and sanitarians (also known as public health inspectors), but again, in each case, the audit committee's recommendations were not implemented. 77 The experiences in other states have been similar to that of Hawaii. For example, DORA of Colorado released a sunset report in 1999 recommending the complete deregulation of manicurists and cosmeticians (aestheticians), but the legislature did not act on the recommendation. 78 
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These examples of failed sunset reviews are further evidence of the lobbying power and legislative influence that many licensed groups possess through their licensing boards or their professional associations. Sunset reviews are also time-consuming and costly. As a result, many of these laws and the sunset review committees that were created have been subsequently limited, suspended, or repealed. A major reason is that the process demands much time of legislators and review committees.
Economist William White has recognized that licensing can bring with it "ratchet" effects that may make it more difficult to eliminate than to introduce in the first place. 80 Ratchet effects can occur because of grandfather clauses, which exempt existing practitioners from newly legislated licensing requirements. The result is that wages may not rise immediately with the onset of licensing requirements, since the supply of workers will not fall until those who are grandfathered leave the occupation. The reverse is not true, however. Should de-licensing occur, wages may be expected to fall immediately with the inflow of new workers with lower qualifications into the occupation. The net result is that the immediate losses to practitioners from de-licensing are likely to be greater than the gains from licensing. Hence, the resistance to de-licensing is likely to be greater as well.
Finally, as we have seen, a number of recent attempts have occurred at the state level-nine as of 2014-to delicense collectively certain groups of occupations. Although these attempts were unsuccessful, the occupational groups proposed for deregulation share some common characteristics. They usually number about one or two dozen, they generally are occupations that require relatively low levels of education, and their deregulation is not likely to sacrifice public health or safety. In most cases, hair workers (barbers, cosmetologists, and hair braiders) are among the occupations proposed for de-licensing. One reason often given is that excessive government regulation, such as occupational licensing, hinders job creation and growth, especially for those with lower levels of education and incomes. Nevertheless, these de-licensing bills have generally been met with stiff opposition and have consequently been withdrawn, defeated, or sent back to committee.
Conclusion
We 7 The National Association of Barber Schools, which later changed its name to the National Association of Barber Styling Schools, dissolved approximately 10 years ago.
8 The grandfather clause in the statute reads, "Any person who can establish within six months after August 19, 1971 , that he or she is a barber or an apprentice as defined under this chapter and can establish reasonable proof that he or she is practicing barbering in a barbershop under sanitary conditions will be given a certificate to practice barbering or an apprentice certificate without any examination upon paying the required fees as prescribed by this chapter." 
